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explicitly is compatible with the falsity of p. Copp argues that this view is superior
to an analogue of Finlay’s view run in terms of conversational simplicature.
The pair of papers by Bar-On and Chrisman and by Copp are substantial
and serious additions to the literature surrounding hybrid or related views of
moral judgment. The latter, in particular, will be of interest to philosophers of
language as well as metaethicists.
In addition to the two pairs of papers I’ve outlined above, the volume
contains papers by Andrew Sepielli (on choosing under conditions of “normative
uncertainty”), Pekka Väyrynen (on the explanatory and epistemological roles
of “hedged moral principles”), Gilbert Harman (advocating guiltfree morality),
Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star (an attempt to offer a unified theory of practical
and theoretical reasons by analyzing both in terms of evidence), Jacob Ross (on
cognitivism about practical reasons), Paul Bloomfield (arguing—contra Rorty,
Blackburn, and Dworkin—that metaethics “is an independent discourse, with a
recognizable subject matter all of its own”; 283), and Luca Ferrero (defending
“constitutivism,” the view that “agency is inescapable in a way that could help
explain its role in grounding unconditional oughts”; 304). Overall, Russ ShaferLandau’s latest volume is a testament to the breadth, depth, and vibrancy of
contemporary metaethics.
Alexander Miller
University of Birmingham

Van Donselaar, Gijs. The Right to Exploit: Parasitism, Scarcity, Basic Income.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 195. $65.00 (cloth).
Philosophical discussion of exploitation in the United States, at least for the past
fifteen years, has tended to focus on exploitation that is mutually beneficial. It
has focused, that is, on transactions from which both parties benefit relative to
their ex ante positions, but which nevertheless involve one of the parties taking
unfair advantage of the other. Commercial surrogacy contracts, the employment
of sweatshop labor, price gouging, and payday loans, for instance, have all been
thought by some to be exploitative in this sense. Writers on exploitation have,
of course, recognized the possibility of harmful exploitation—transactions that
are not only unfair but that set back the interests of the exploited party. But
this sort of exploitation has not received much attention, partly, I suspect, because its wrongfulness has seemed obvious, and therefore philosophically uninteresting, and partly because the wrongfulness of such actions can usually be
explained by reference to some other less controversial and obscure moral concept such as coercion or deception.
Gijs van Donselaar’s book is about exploitation of the harmful sort. Of course,
whether an interaction is harmful or mutually beneficial depends on the baseline
against which we compare its results. And van Donselaar’s conception of exploitation, which he refers to as “parasitism,” employs a baseline of a rather unusual
sort. Parasitism, according to van Donselaar, occurs when in virtue of a property
rights relation between A and B, “A is worse off than she would have been had
B not existed or if she would have had nothing to do with him, while B is better
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off than he would have been without A, or having nothing to do with her, or vice
versa” (4). As an illustrative case, van Donselaar describes the action of a certain
Mr. Pickles who deliberately diverted the course of a stream that flowed through
his land away from a downstream community’s reservoir, with the sole purpose
of forcing that community to purchase the water back from him. Superficially,
the exchange of money for water is mutually beneficial. But since the community
would have kept both its water and its money had Mr. Pickles never existed, while
Pickles would have been poorer without the existence of the community to exploit,
the exchange qualifies as parasitic on van Donselaar’s account.
Van Donselaar derives his understanding of parasitism from David Gauthier’s
interpretation of the Lockean Proviso, and the first half of the book is devoted
to a detailed examination of the Proviso as employed by Gauthier, Locke, and
Nozick. For the sake of brevity, I will limit my discussion of this portion of the
book to the treatment of Gauthier. Van Donselaar argues that the actual requirements of the Proviso are inconsistent with Gauther’s quasi-libertarian views on
property rights and market exchange. The kind of fixed rights in external resources endorsed by libertarians endow individuals not merely with rights to use
those goods for consumption or production but with the right to use them for
trade. And with the right to trade comes the potential for what van Donselaar
calls the “abuse of rights.” Such cases arise when a party sells a right in which it
has no “independent interest”—no interest, that is, other than the interest in
profiting from the sale of the right. Van Donselaar finds an instance of such abuse
in Ronald Coase’s seminal essay on “The Problem of Social Costs.” In it, Coase
asks us to imagine a farmer who owns land that could grow $10 worth of crops
but only at a cost of $11. Such land has no independent value to the farmer as
farmland. But if the farmer has fixed rights in that land, including a right to be
compensated for the full value of any damage done to her crops by the neighboring
cattle rancher, then it could be in her interest to threaten to grow crops merely
so that the rancher (anxious to avoid the prospective liability) will pay her not to.
This is parasitism of precisely the sort that the Lockean Proviso should prohibit.
And what it shows, according to van Donselaar, is that the only property rights in
external goods consistent with the Proviso are “evanescent” ones (55). They must
be evanescent because anyone who claims a right to external resources which she
does not put to maximally productive use is, according to van Donselaar, a parasite.
After all, if you have saleable rights in resources that could be put to better use
by someone else, then you are profiting from the existence of others who have
an incentive to purchase your rights from you, and others are worse off by the
fact that you exist and acted more quickly than they in acquiring the resource in
the first place. And since new technologies are constantly being developed, new
discoveries are constantly being made, and consumer demand is constantly changing, property rights will need to be continually readjusted in order to eliminate
the possibility of this form of parasitism.
The second half of the book is devoted to a discussion of the Universal
Basic Income (UBI) as advocated by Philippe Van Parijs and its foundation in
Ronald Dworkin’s doctrine of “equality of resources.” Van Donselaar rejects both
doctrines, once again by appealing to the idea of parasitism. His arguments
contain an incredible amount of detail, especially his discussion of the relation
between envy-freeness, Pareto optimality, and nonparasitism in chapter 4, but
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the ultimate conclusion is unsurprising. A UBI is parasitic because it does not
discriminate between those who are poor because of bad luck and those who
are poor because they are unwilling to work. It therefore allows the “Lazy” to
benefit from the existence and diligence of those whose work provides the
funding for the UBI, while the hard working are made worse off by the existence
of Lazies whom they are obligated to support.
It is difficult to evaluate the success of van Donselaar’s project in this book,
largely because it is difficult to discern exactly what that project is. Is van Donselaar making a normative argument about a principle of justice? Or is his goal
more exegetical in nature? He states, early on, that the prohibition on parasitism
embodied in the Lockean Proviso is “a sound principle of justice” (7), and much
of the book is devoted to articulating that principle and tracing out its implications in great detail. But much of the time, it seems like van Donselaar is
simply trying to assess the success or implications of others’ arguments. Chapter
2, for instance, is really more an extended critique of Gauthier than a unified
argument for the author’s own position. And chapter 3 on Locke devotes a great
amount of attention to issues of textual interpretation, including a concluding
section on the presence or absence of commas in various editions of Locke’s
second treatise.
Moreover, if van Donselaar’s project is indeed to provide an independent
moral argument, it is deficient in several respects. The most significant of these
is the absence of any argument at all for the status of the prohibition on parasitism as a valid principle of justice. Van Donselaar does, to be sure, provide a
number of cases—including that of Mr. Pickles—where parasitism seems morally
objectionable. But this is a far cry from defending the claim that parasitism as
such is always morally wrong. And indeed such a claim hardly seems plausible.
Many perfectly ordinary, perfectly unobjectionable instances of market exchange
qualify as parasitic on van Donselaar’s understanding of the term. Suppose you
and I compete for a position which you, being the more highly qualified candidate, receive. And suppose that I, failing to get the job I really want, take a
job as your secretary and do a better job than anyone else would have done at
it. You are better off because of my existence, but I am worse off because of
yours. But surely, you have not acted wrongly at all. Or consider the vast range
of cases where we believe that one person has a positive duty of justice to provide
aid to another. If you are drowning in a shallow pond and I am the only passerby
in a position to rescue you (albeit at the cost of ruining my expensive clothes),
then you are made better off by my existence while I am made worse off by
yours. But does this make you a parasite? And if so, does this mean that van
Donselaar is committed to condemning as parasites all those members of
society—the elderly, the infirm, the poor—who are dependent on the support
of others?
Even if parasitism could be established as a prima facie wrong, van Donselaar’s application of his principle is marred by a tendency to equate individuals’
“independent interests” with their interests in commercial production. To borrow one of van Donselaar’s examples, suppose that “Lazy” owns two tracts of
land but is interested in working only one, while “Crazy” owns two tracts of land
but would like to work three. Were Lazy to sell her second tract to Crazy, she
would be guilty of parasitism, according to Donselaar. This, he says, is because
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Lazy had no independent interest in the land and was thus merely engaging in
what van Donselaar calls “usurpation” to profit from Crazy’s desire to work more
land (136). Thus, according to van Donselaar’s principles, no injustice would
be done to Lazy if the land were to be forcibly seized from her and given to
Crazy for more productive use. This principle, then, seems to support a system
with all of a market society’s objectionable features and none of its redeeming
ones. For one of the great virtues of a market system is that the wealth it generates
provides people with the ability to engage in activities that are not maximally
productive of commercial value. I am a much, much less efficient brewer of
beer than August Anheuser Bush. But because I’m a not-so-horrible professor
of philosophy, I can afford to be relatively inefficient in my brewing and allow
myself to enjoy the process. My interest, however, along with Lazy’s interest in
using her second tract of land for relaxation or aesthetic enjoyment, does not
count for van Donselaar. Neglect of noncommercial but independent interests
undermines his claim that Lazy—or, crucially, recipients of the UBI—are
parasitic.
Van Donselaar himself realizes that the Lockean Proviso is problematic. He
explicitly states early in the book that those “who wish to argue for solidarity
with the wretched as a fundamental moral principle will need to argue that the
Lockean proviso, on Gauthier’s interpretation of it, is of limited of moral significance or at least not exhaustive of all that is of moral weight” (14). Indeed,
its insensitivity to the needy is not the only problem with the Lockean Proviso’s
prohibition on parasitism. The elimination of parasitism, van Donselaar convincingly argues, is also incompatible with Pareto optimality, at least under certain circumstances (137). It is for this reason that van Donselaar hopes to develop
an alternative principle of distributive justice that he calls the “principle of
equality-based progressive satiation” or, more pithily, “Maimonides’s Rule” (171).
This principle, in its original form, states that we ought to “Give an equal amount
to every claimant or the full amount of his claim, whichever is smaller” (171).
And it is meant to reconcile a prohibition of parasitism with Pareto optimality.
It does not, however, address the problem of those whose needs, perhaps due
to disability, are especially great (since under conditions of scarcity they will
presumably be given only an equal share of resources and this will be insufficient
to meet their need). And it does not address the kind of parasitism that van
Donselaar describes as “usury,” where an individual has an independent interest
in an object but sells it for a value higher than the value of that interest (136,
172). More seriously, the implications and defensibility of the principle are left
quite unclear since van Donselaar devotes just a little more than three of the
final pages of the book to explaining it. One cannot help but think that the
book would have been greatly improved had more detail been supplied at this
crucial junction, even if it came at the cost of cutting some of the earlier exegetical material.
Unfortunately, many of the criticisms I have presented in this review are
not new. Much of The Right to Exploit derives from van Donselaar’s dissertation,
circulated under the title “The Benefit of Another’s Pains” (1997, Universiteit
van Amsterdam). And the arguments contained therein were subjected to scrutiny in several published pieces, especially by Karl Widerquist (see his “Who
Exploits Who?” Political Studies 54 [2006]: 444–64). It is disappointing, then, to
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find that van Donselaar has chosen not to respond to these criticisms in the
present volume. He has a remarkable ability in philosophic exposition. Countless
times throughout the book we are provided with a dense summary of one of
Gauthier’s or Van Parijs’s complicated arguments only to find it followed by a
single elegant sentence in which van Donselaar captures the essence of the
argument. Moreover, The Right to Exploit is full of innovative, surprising, and
enlightening arguments. One wishes, then, that his evident philosophic skill had
been better employed in filling some of the book’s significant gaps.
Matt Zwolinski
University of San Diego

Wolf, Susan. The Meaning of Life and Why It Matters.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. 160. $24.95 (cloth).
The book comprises the two Tanner Lectures given by Susan Wolf at Princeton
in 2007; helpful comments by John Koethe, Robert M. Adams, Nomy Arpaly,
and Jonathan Haidt; Wolf ’s replies; and a brief introduction by Stephen Macedo.
Wolf writes elegantly and thoughtfully, and the book, which seems to preserve
in length and style its origins as two lectures, is full of sensible, suggestive ideas.
The Tanner Lectures are meant to reach a nonspecialist audience, and some
specialist readers may wish to have more on less, a desire likely to affect especially
those who, like myself, share Wolf’s basic approach to these matters.
Wolf advances what she calls the fitting fulfillment view of the meaning of
life: “Meaning arises from loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them
in a positive way” (8). “Essentially the idea is that a person’s life can be meaningful only if she cares fairly deeply about some thing or things, only if she is
gripped, excited, interested, engaged, or . . . if she loves something. Even a
person who is so engaged, however, will not live a meaningful life if the objects
or activities with which she is so occupied are worthless” (9). Meaning, according
to Wolf, is a distinct kind of value that the meaningful life possesses. Furthermore,
“what gives meaning to our lives gives us reasons to live, even when we do not
care much, for our own sake, whether we live or die.” And this is so even when
the prospects for our own well-being are bleak. As Camus said, what is worth
living for is also worth dying for (56–57), so it gives us also reasons to die.
These are the main theses of the book. Are they right? “Meaning,” Wolf
tells us, “comes from active engagement in projects of worth” (58). This seems
on the right lines. But compare it with: “Well-being consists in success in the
whole-hearted pursuit of valuable relationships and goals.” (The quotation is
from “The Role of Well-Being, ” Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004): 269–94, 279,
where I explore the relations of well-being and the meaning of life. It summarizes
the view of well-being I have been advocating since The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).) Others have advocated similar views, and
of course Wolf is aware of them. Ignore the success or failure of these formulations as accounts of either well-being or the meaning of life. The vital question
is, what is the relationship between a life of well-being and a meaningful life?
Why “vital”? Because, as Wolf, who is an attentive observer of normative phe-
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